[{"url":"https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2019/04/i-dressup-data-security-mess","source":"FTC USA Business Blog Posts","description":"i-Dressup and a data security mess-up lfair April 24, 2019 | 3:08PM i-Dressup and a data security mess-up By Lesley Fair Kids love to play dress-up, but parents wouldn’t want them rummaging through the attic or climbing to the top shelf of the wardrobe without permission and proper supervision. The i-Dressup.com website offered users – including children – a virtual way to play dress-up and design clothes without those potential dangers. But according to an FTC complaint, Unixiz, Inc. , the company behind i-Dressup, violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act in ways that created different kinds of risks. COPPA puts two separate sets of protections in place to help keep parents in control of personal information collected from their kids online. First, COPPA-covered companies must clearly disclose their information policies and get parental consent before collecting personal information from children under 13. Second, companies must provide reasonable and appropriate security for the data they collect. According to an FTC settlement, i-Dressup fell short on both COPPA requirements. The complaint alleges i-Dressup failed to provide sufficient notice on its site of the information it collected online from kids, how it used it, its disclosure practices, and other specifics required by the COPPA Rule. The company’s direct notices to parents were deficient, too. Among other things, they didn’t include the COPPA-required statement that if parents don’t provide consent within a reasonable time, i-Dressup will delete their online contact information from its records. Stick with the story because that failure turned out to be particularly troubling. In addition to letting users play online games, i-Dressup featured a community where they could “explore their creativity and fashion sense with unique personal profiles” and interact with others. To register, i-Dressup required people to submit a user name, password, birthdate, and email address. If the birthdate indicated the person was under 13, the email field changed to “Parent’s Email.” Once the under-13 user filled in the required fields and clicked “Join Now,” i-Dressup collected the personal information and sent a message to the address entered into the Parent’s Email field. The person receiving the email could consent by clicking the “Activate Now!” button. However, if the parent didn’t give consent, i-Dressup retained the personal information it had collected from the child online. The FTC says the company’s failure to delete that information violated Section 312.5(c)(1) of the COPPA Rule. In addition to violating COPPA’s parental consent provisions, i-Dressup allegedly violated the Rule’s data security requirements . According to the FTC, i-Dressup stored and transmitted users’ personal information (including passwords) in plain text. In addition, the company failed to perform network vulnerability testing of its network, even for well-known threats like SQL attacks; it didn’t implement an intrusion detection and prevention system; and it didn’t monitor for potential security incidents. The upshot? The company learned that a hacker had gained entry to its network and accessed information about 2.1 million users, including approximately 245,000 users who indicated they were under 13. To settle the case , i-Dressup and its owners will pay a $35,000 civil penalty. They’re also prohibited from violating COPPA in the future, and can’t sell, share, or collect any personal information until they implement a comprehensive data security program and get independent biennial assessments. In addition, they’ll have to provide the FTC with an annual certification of compliance. The message for sites and operators covered by COPPA is that an effective system of parental consent is only the first step toward compliance. Section 312.8 of the COPPA Rule also requires you to “establish and maintain reasonable","id":3203250,"pubDate":"Thu, 08 Oct 2026 08:06:59 +0200","titre":"i-Dressup and a data security mess-up"},{"url":"https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2017/08/stick-security-require-secure-passwords-authentication","source":"FTC USA Business Blog Posts","id":3197409,"pubDate":"Mon, 05 Oct 2026 08:07:08 +0200","titre":"Stick with Security: Require secure passwords and authentication","description":"Stick with Security: Require secure passwords and authentication lfair August 11, 2017 | 10:47AM Stick with Security: Require secure passwords and authentication By Thomas B. Pahl, Acting Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection To make it harder for hackers to bluff their way onto a computer network, careful companies follow the advice of Start with Security and require strong authentication practices . We’ve considered FTC settlements, closed investigations, and the questions we get from businesses about implementing good authentication “hygiene.” Here are some tips on using effective authentication procedures to help safeguard your network. Insist on long, complex, and unique passwords. A password’s very reason for being is to be easy for a user to remember, but hard for a fraudster to figure out. Obvious choices like ABCABC, 121212, or qwerty are the digital equivalent of a “hack me” sign. Furthermore, experts have determined that passphrases or longer passwords are generally harder to crack. The smarter strategy is for companies to think through their standards, implement minimum requirements, and educate users about how to create stronger passwords. Also, when you install software, applications, or hardware on your network, computers, or devices, change the default password immediately. And if you design products that require consumers to use a password, configure the initial set-up so they have to change the default password. Example: A staff member attempts to select payroll as the password for the database that includes employee payroll information. The company sets up its system to reject an obvious choice like that. Example: To access the corporate network, a business allows employees to type in their username and a shared password common to everyone who works there. Employees are also allowed to use that shared password to access other services on the system, some of which contain sensitive personal information. The more prudent policy would be to require strong, unique passwords for each employee and to insist that they use different passwords to access different applications. Example: At a staff meeting, a company’s IT manager offers tips for employees about good password hygiene. She explains that passphrases or longer passwords are better than short passwords based on standard dictionary words or well-known information (for example, a child’s name, a pet, a birthday, or a favorite sports team). By establishing a more secure corporate password standard and educating employees about implementing it, the IT manager is taking a step to help her company reduce the risk of unauthorized access. Store passwords securely. A company’s first line of defense against data thieves is a workforce trained to keep passwords secret. But even the strongest password is ineffective if an employee writes it on a sticky note on her desk or shares it with someone else. Train your staff not to disclose passwords in response to phone calls or emails, including ones that may appear to be coming from a colleague. Con artists have been known to impersonate corporate officials by spoofing phone numbers or email addresses. A compromised password poses a particular risk if it can be used to open the door to even more sensitive information – for example, a database of other user credentials maintained on the network in plain, readable text. Make it difficult for data thieves to turn a lucky password guess into a catastrophic breach of your company’s most sensitive data by implementing policies and procedures to store credentials securely. Example: A new employee gets a call from someone who claims to be the company’s system administrator. The caller asks him to verify his network password. Because the new staffer learned about impersonation scams at an in-house security orientation, he refuses to disclose his password and instead reports the incident to the appropriate person in the company. Example: A company keeps user credentials and other passwords in plain"},{"url":"https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2016/06/practice-fusion-case-suggests-6-health-privacy-pointers","source":"FTC USA Business Blog Posts","description":"Practice Fusion case suggests 6 health privacy pointers lfair June 8, 2016 | 9:01AM Practice Fusion case suggests 6 health privacy pointers By Lesley Fair Combine two of the most talked-about consumer protection topics – health privacy and consumer-generated online content – and what do you get? A proposed FTC settlement with Practice Fusion, the largest cloud-based electronic health records company in the country, and six compliance tips for others in the industry. One of San Francisco-based Practice Fusion’s primary products is an electronic records system for outpatient providers. In 2009, the company launched “Patient Fusion,” an online portal where patients whose providers were already using Practice Fusion could view or download their health information or transmit it to another provider. Patient Fusion also let patients send and receive secure messages from their providers. Fast forward several years and the company decided to expand Patient Fusion to include a public directory where current and prospective enrollees could search for doctors geographically or by specialty, read patient reviews of providers, and request appointments. But Practice Fusion had to ask itself a question familiar to many online companies: How do we get the content – in this case, patient reviews? That’s the focus of the FTC’s lawsuit. According to the complaint , Practice Fusion solicited data in a misleading way that led some patients to believe they were sending follow-up messages directly to their doctors about their diagnosis, medical treatment, prescriptions, etc. – and not contributing content to a public website. Practice Fusion, however, populated its new site with the information those people provided, some of which was highly sensitive. Here’s what happened. After appointments with their doctors, patients received emails titled “How was your visit?” The message continued, “To help improve your service in the future, please let us know how your visit went” and included a link with rating stars. The message ended this way: Thank you, Dr. [Name] In a footer, the message said “This email was sent to you by Patient Fusion®, a tool Doctor [Name] uses to deliver the highest quality of care to patients.” Below that in smaller print it said “Sent on behalf of Doctor [Name]’s office by: Practice Fusion.” If patients clicked the link, they were taken to a page that asked for feedback about things like how long they had to wait for their appointment, the doctor’s bedside manner, and whether their medical concern was addressed. There also was a text box where patients were invited to “leave a review for your provider.” Below that was a pre-checked box with the phrase “Keep this review anonymous.” What did some people put in that box? Highly sensitive information directly addressed to their doctors, not evaluations meant to be shared publicly. Here are just a few examples: “Dr [name], My Xanax prescription that I received on Monday was for 1 tablet a day but usually it’s for 2 tablets a day. I have not taken it to the pharmacy yet. Can I pick up a new one, or can I get a prescription called into a pharmacy? Thanks, [patient’s full name] “I called today and left a message regarding my daughter and no one has returned my call. I think she is depressed and has stated several times this week that she wishes she was dead. Could someone please call me [phone number]?” “The cefuroxime axetil does not seem to be doing anything for me. I did a little research and I think I have a yeast infection called candida. Not sure what to do about it yet. I guess I will first try to change my diet. Medication? [patient’s full name] “I would like to make an appointment for my back pain and possible shingles. Can you please call me @ [phone number]? Thank you! [patient's full name]” “I HAVE NO INFECTION [healthcare provider name].  EVERYTHING WENT","id":3194910,"pubDate":"Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:09:37 +0200","titre":"Practice Fusion case suggests 6 health privacy pointers"},{"source":"Federal Trade Commission - Protecting America's Consumers","url":"https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/08/ftc-finalizes-orders-cox-media-group-two-other-firms-settling-charges-they-deceived-customers-about","description":"The Federal Trade Commission finalized orders requiring Cox Media Group (CMG) and two other firms to pay a total of $930,000 to settle allegations they deceived customers by falsely claiming to offer an AI-powered service that could target localized ads based on conversations captured from consumers’ smart devices and that consumers had opted into such targeting. In three separate complaints first announced in May , the FTC alleged that Georgia-based media and marketing company CMG Media Corporation, which does business as  Cox Media Group , and two marketing firms it worked with, New Hampshire-based MindSift LLC  and Wisconsin-based  1010 Digital Works LLC ,  deceived customers by claiming they used a special algorithm to listen in on and detect pertinent conversations from smart devices in order to target ads to consumers within a specific geographic region. Contrary to these companies’ claims, however, the marketing service wasn’t based on voice data, and consumers hadn’t opted into this service. If the service had functioned as advertised, this collection and use of consumers’ voice data without adequate consent would itself violate the FTC Act. Under the proposed orders settling the FTC’s allegations,  CMG must pay $880,000 while both  MindSift and  1010 Digital Works  must each pay $25,000, which will be used to provide redress to CMG customers impacted by these practices. In addition, each defendant is prohibited from making any misrepresentation about the qualities or features of its advertising or marketing services; the collection and use of voice data and whether consumers have provided their consent to collect, use or disclose their voice data; and the geographic targeting capabilities of its advertising or marketing services. After receiving two comments on the proposed settlement orders, the Commission voted 2-0 to give final approval to the consent","titre":"FTC Finalizes Orders with Cox Media Group, Two Other Firms Settling Charges They Deceived Customers About “Active Listening” AI-Powered Marketing Service","id":3120376,"pubDate":"Fri, 28 Aug 2026 08:07:59 +0200"}]