[{"id":3248599,"description":"UT ref: UA-2026-000083-PIP In the Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber 28 October 2026 Before: Stewart Wright Judge of the Upper Tribunal Between: LC -v- Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Anonymity Order Appellant: LC Respondents: Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Tribunal: First tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) Tribunal venue: Scarborough Tribunal Case Nos: SC231/24/00181 Tribunal decision date: 29 August 2025 NOTICE: Any breach of this order is liable to be treated as a contempt of court and may be punishable by imprisonment, fine or other sanctions under section 25 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. The maximum punishment that may be imposed is a sentence of two years’ imprisonment or an unlimited fine. It is ordered , under rule 14(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal Rules) 2008, that, without the permission of this Tribunal, no one shall disclose or publish the name, or any part of the address, of the appellant in these proceedings or publish or reveal any other information that would be likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. The appellant shall be known as LC. Anyone who objects to this order may apply to the Upper Tribunal for it to be varied or set aside. A copy of this Order shall be published on the website of the Judiciary of England and Wales. REASONS This anonymity order is made on the application of the appellant. It is sought because “the appeal involves a disabled claimant and details of their disability are to reasonably be inferred from a prospectively publicised decision”. I have by a separate decision allowed the appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal. That decision will be published on public facing websites and, if no anonymity order is made, the appellant would be named in that decision. The principle of open justice is of fundamental importance to the justice system. An aspect of open justice is that parties’ names are made public. Derogation from this principle requires justification. Particular regard must be given to the importance of the right to freedom of expression, including the right to publish reports of cases. In this case, I am satisfied that it is necessary to derogate from the open justice principle to the limited extent of not naming the appellant. The appellant has ADHD and anxiety and depression and those features of his health and conditions need to be referred to in the decision on the appeal. In that context, I am satisfied that an anonymity order should be made because I accept a risk of harm could arise for this vulnerable appellant if he was to be identified in these proceedings, because those health details would then be in the public domain. The public interest in open justice and freedom of expression will still be served by this order and the final decision in this appeal being published online. The letters LC are not the appellant’s initials. The post LC v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (anonymity order) appeared first on Courts and Tribunals Judiciary","source":"Judgement Courts Tribunals England Wales","pubDate":"Thu, 29 Oct 2026 08:01:50 +0100","titre":"LC v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (anonymity order)","url":"https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/lc-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-anonymity-order/"},{"description":"By: Susannah Tredwell , Manager of Library Services at DLA Piper (Canada) LLP and James Bachmann , Instructional Librarian, Law Library, University of British Columbia Since 1988, when CALL/ACBD’s Copyright Committee was first set up, CALL/ACBD has advocated for its members' interests in the area of copyright. While the primary focus of CALL/ACBD’s copyright advocacy over the last few years has been on Crown copyright and primary law, CALL/ACBD has also made submissions about such areas as fair dealing and licencing. CALL/ACBD sees this work as not only supporting the needs of its members but also as serving the interests of access to justice as a whole. Continuing this work, on January 18, 2022 CALL/ACBD, along with Library Futures Institute, will act as an intervener in the Supreme Court of Canada case Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, et al. v. Entertainment Software Association, et al.   Kim Nayyer, CALL/ACBD’s President, and Robert Janes of JFK Law   will be representing CALL/ACBD and Library Futures. This case addresses the question of how the concepts of “communication to the public by telecommunication” and “making available on demand” as used in the Copyright Act should be understood. The outcome of this case has the potential to significantly impact various library activities, including controlled digital lending and possibly even the simple use of hyperlinks, particularly in light of the limited scope of current library and education exceptions in the Copyright Act . CALL/ACBD's submitted that the court refrain from broadly construing the terms “making available” and “Communication to the Public by Telecommunication” and that s. 2.4(1.1) of the act (\"Communication to the public by telecommunication\")   does not need to be understood as creating a new right.   You can find CALL/ACBD’s intervener's factum at https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/39418/FM050_Intervener_Canadian-Association-Law-Libraries-et-al.pdf . The other factums in this case are available at https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/af-ma-eng.aspx?cas=39418 .  CALL/ACBD has acted as an intervener at the Supreme Court of Canada on two other occasions. In Keatley Surveying Ltd. v. Teranet Inc. , which looked at Crown copyright, CALL/ACBD submitted   that “s. 12 Crown copyright does not extend to primary sources of law”. In York University v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency  (\"Access Copyright\"), CALL/ACBD submitted   that the SCC “should resist the temptation to modify or clarify the existing fair dealing test” stating that the existing test “is a flexible multifactorial test that allows libraries (and other institutions) to tailor access and appropriate copying policies that consider all relevant circumstances.” CALL/ACBD also made submissions to the 2018 review of the Copyright Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42: one general submission   and <a","id":3241460,"source":"Canadian Association of Law Libraries / L'Association canadienne des bibliothèques de droit CALL/ACBD Blog","titre":"Canadian Association of Law Libraries Intervention in Upcoming Supreme Court of Canada Copyright Case","url":"https://www.callacbd.ca/CALL-Blog/12242053","pubDate":"Mon, 26 Oct 2026 07:55:47 +0100"},{"source":"Judgement Courts Tribunals England Wales","id":3237207,"description":"Case No: CH-2025-000115 In the High Court of Justice Business and Property Division Appeals List On appeal from decision no. O/0257/25 of Allan James, Hearing Officer for the Registrar, dated 20 March 2025, under s76(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 Date: 23 October 2026 Before: Mr Justice Richards Between: Fifth Avenue Entertainment LLC -and- Commodore Entertainment Corporation The post Fifth Avenue Entertainment LLC -v- Commodore Entertainment Corporation appeared first on Courts and Tribunals Judiciary","pubDate":"Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:07:26 +0200","titre":"Fifth Avenue Entertainment LLC -v- Commodore Entertainment Corporation","url":"https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/fifth-avenue-entertainment-llc-v-commodore-entertainment-corporation/"},{"source":"Arcom Textes juridiques","id":3233315,"description":"The French regulatory authority for audiovisual and digital communication (hereinafter ‘Arcom’), Having regard to Act No. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986, as amended, on freedom of communication, in particular Articles 3-1 and 48 thereof; Having regard to the Decree of 13 November 1987, as amended, approving the terms of reference and specifications of Radio France and the National Audiovisual Institute; Having regard to Decree No. 2009-79 of 23 June 2009, as amended, laying down the terms of reference for the national broadcaster France Télévisions; Having regard to Decree No. 2012-85 of 25 January 2012, as amended, laying down the terms of reference of the national broadcasting organisation responsible for France’s international audiovisual services (France Médias Monde); Having regard to the submission of a case before the court on 20 July 2026 concerning a draft decree amending the terms of reference and specifications of the national broadcasting organisations; Having deliberated on 27 July 2026, issues the following opinion: By letter dated 20 July 2026, the Government referred to Arcom a draft amendment to the decrees approving the terms of reference and conditions of France Télévisions, Radio France and the company responsible for France’s audiovisual services (France Médias Monde). These amendments are intended, in particular, to implement notices Nos. 1 to 4, 6 to 9 and 14 of the remit entrusted to Mr Bruno Lasserre, Honorary Vice-President of the Council of State, concerning the impartiality of the audiovisuel public service broadcasting, the conclusions of which were made public on 29 May 2026. In this regard, ARCOM welcomes the swift implementation of the proposals in the Lasserre report falling within its regulatory remit. The draft legislation submitted for its consideration makes it possible, in particular, to better define the scope of the requirement for impartiality and to enshrine it explicitly in the legislation setting out the obligations of public service broadcasters in the audiovisual sector. These new requirements will, however, necessitate the allocation of dedicated means, in particular to deal with the submission of cases before the court and to improve the functioning of the committees on integrity, independence and plurality of information and programmes (CHIPIP). The draft decree also summons ARCOM to make the following comments. I. – Provisions relating to the impartiality of public audiovisuel broadcasting Clarification of the requirement for impartiality and the obligations arising therefrom The draft decree clarifies the requirement for ‘impartiality in the public audiovisual industry’ set out in Article 3-1 of the Act of 30 September 1986, which is defined as ‘ an essential condition for building the necessary trust between the public, in all its diversity, and the public service, a common good that belongs to all”, implying “a duty to set an example in terms of transparency and honesty in reporting, as well as respect for the plurality of schools of thought and opinion ’ without hindering ‘the definition of an editorial line which, whilst implementing these principles, sets the services offered by the company apart’. The draft decree echoes the wording of the first notice of the Lasserre report and specifies in this regard that the requirement is to be assessed in a manner proportionate to the nature and format of the programmes and entails: the adoption, by each national broadcaster, of an editorial charter setting out the ethical rules applicable to news and the programmes that contribute to it; the establishment of proceedings for handling complaints regarding compliance with the charter; the publication of an annual report on the public’s perception of the impartiality of the services provided by the aforementioned broadcasters. As part of the monitoring of compliance with the terms of reference and specifications, Arcom, which is legally responsible for","pubDate":"Thu, 22 Oct 2026 08:04:53 +0200","url":"https://www.arcom.fr/en/find-out-more/legal-area/legal-resources/opinion-27-july-2026-amendment-terms-reference-and-specifications-national-programme-companies-france-televisions-radio-france-and-france-medias-monde","titre":"Opinion of 27 July 2026 on the amendment of the terms of reference and specifications of the national programme companies France Télévisions, Radio France and France Médias Monde"},{"url":"https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2017/07/we-cant-go-no-can-do","titre":"We can’t go for that (no can do)","pubDate":"Tue, 06 Oct 2026 14:06:39 +0200","source":"FTC USA Business Blog Posts","description":"We can’t go for that (no can do) lfair July 17, 2017 | 11:38AM We can’t go for that (no can do) By Lesley Fair Of course, phantom debt collection – the practice of pressuring people to pay “debts” they don’t owe – harms consumers. But as an FTC complaint demonstrates, when phantom debt collectors strike, they could affect your company, too. According to the FTC , a Florida-based outfit engaged in a scheme to defraud consumers through the collection of debts people didn’t actually owe or the company didn’t have the authority to collect. The complaint charges that the defendants – Hardco Holding Group, S & H Financial Group, Dequan M. Sicard, and Daryl M. Hall (no, not that Daryl Hall) – violated the FTC Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. When contacting consumers, in many instances the defendants allegedly impersonated attorneys and threatened to have people thrown in jail if they didn’t pay up on delinquent payday loans – loans, remember, that many consumers didn’t take out in the first place and defendants didn’t have the right to collect. One tactic involved contacting people with a “case number” and directing them to dial a callback number. On the second call, the defendants allegedly said they were affiliated with named law firms and that the consumer had committed a felony, could go to prison, or faced arrest. According to the complaint , to boost the credibility of their threat of pending or imminent legal action, the defendants claimed to have the consumer’s Social Security number, bank account number, or contact information for family members. Afraid of legal repercussions, many consumers knuckled under to the demand for payment. The FTC says the defendants also told third parties that consumers owed money, a violation of the FDCPA. In addition, the complaint charges that the defendants didn’t disclose their identity to consumers, failed to provide proper validation notices, and used other false, misleading, and abusive tactics. Phantom debt collectors unquestionably injure consumers, but how could conduct like that affect your company? According to the lawsuit, when pressed to identify themselves, the defendants often gave the names or addresses of legitimate small businesses that had nothing to do with the purported debt or the debt collectors. When concerned consumers contacted those companies to complain, their employees got an understandably angry earful. From the FTC’s perspective, unrelated small businesses shouldn’t have their reputations sullied by others’ allegedly illegal tactics. A federal court in Orlando has temporarily halted the operation and frozen its assets. The FTC wants to stop the illegal practices once and for all. What can consumers do if they’re getting calls for debts they don’t owe ? File a complaint with the FTC. How can small businesses help protect their good names? Every now and then, do a selfie search with your company name and a word like “debt.” If you see consumer posts that suggest that a debt collector is illegally using your name – or if your employees are getting complaints about debt collection calls supposedly coming from your company – let the FTC know about it , too. In the meantime, businesses looking for FDCPA compliance resources can visit the FTC’s debt collection page for some – in the words of the other Daryl Hall (and let’s not forget John Oates) – “Adult Education.”","id":3200011},{"pubDate":"Sat, 03 Oct 2026 14:06:14 +0200","titre":"Judge orders $13.4 million in contempt action challenging BlueHippo hype","url":"https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2016/05/judge-orders-134-million-contempt-action-challenging-bluehippo-hype","source":"FTC USA Business Blog Posts","id":3195790,"description":"Judge orders $13.4 million in contempt action challenging BlueHippo hype lfair May 2, 2016 | 10:52AM Judge orders $13.4 million in contempt action challenging BlueHippo hype By Lesley Fair Animation fans remember the ballet-dancing pink hippos in Fantasia . In Egyptian mythology, the god of disorder was depicted as a red hippo. And many consumers – especially those already in financial distress – were drawn in by national TV and radio ads for BlueHippo, a company that claimed to finance the purchase of computers and other electronics for people with “less than perfect credit, bad credit, no credit.” A $13.4 million ruling by a United States District Judge in an FTC contempt action sends a message to hippos of all hues (and businesses) about the FTC’s commitment to effective order enforcement. In 2008, the FTC sued BlueHippo Funding and BlueHippo Capital for, among other things, not delivering ordered merchandise, failing to make disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, and illegally conditioning the extension of credit on consumers’ “agreement” to repay by preauthorized electronic debit. One common tactic was that BlueHippo said it would deliver the product once the consumer made 13 weekly payments, but then didn’t make good on that promise. The FTC also alleged that in many instances, BlueHippo debited consumers’ accounts without first disclosing that consumers couldn’t get a refund even if they cancelled before delivery. The defendants settled that case , agreeing to pay up to $5 million in redress and to change how they did business in the future. The FTC went back to court in 2009 , alleging that BlueHippo was flouting the terms of the settlement and continuing to engage in illegal practices. The Court granted the FTC’s contempt motion against the corporate defendants and CEO Joseph Rensin, but entered a remedy of only $609,000. The FTC appealed the financial ruling. Arguing that there should be a presumption that consumers relied on the defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions, the FTC sought a contempt order of $14 million – the gross sales the defendants generated through their illegal conduct. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled , “We agree with the FTC and join our sister circuits in adopting a presumption of consumer reliance in FTC civil contempt actions.” The appellate court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine “whether the FTC has demonstrated that it is entitled to a presumption of consumer reliance. If so, the court should use defendants’ gross receipts as a baseline for calculating the consumers’ actual loss, and defendants should then be afforded an opportunity to proffer evidence showing that an offset of the baseline is warranted.” What’s the latest development? On remand, the trial court entered a judgment against CEO Rensin for $13.4 million, the financial harm the court determined that consumers suffered as a result of the scheme. The case is another illustration of the FTC’s interest in effective order enforcement. To settle cases and then not follow through to see that defendants live up to their promises would be, well, hippo-critical."},{"titre":"Glencore Energy UK Ltd -v- Prax Lindsey Oil Refinery Limited (in liquidation)","url":"https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/glencore-energy-uk-ltd-v-prax-lindsey-oil-refinery-limited-in-liquidation/","pubDate":"Mon, 21 Sep 2026 14:12:20 +0200","description":"Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2394 (Ch) Case No: CR-2025-004409 In the High Court of Justice Chancery Division Business and Property Courts of England and Wales Insolvency and Companies List (ChD) 21 September 2026 Before: Mr Justice Trower In the matter of Prax Lindsey Oil Refinery Limited (in liquidation) and in the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 Between: Glencore Energy UK Ltd -v- Prax Lindsey Oil Refinery Limited (in liquidation) The post Glencore Energy UK Ltd -v- Prax Lindsey Oil Refinery Limited (in liquidation) appeared first on Courts and Tribunals Judiciary","id":3167990,"source":"Judgement Courts Tribunals England Wales"},{"pubDate":"Fri, 14 Aug 2026 14:05:49 +0200","titre":"Secretary of State for Justice -v- Glyn Razzell","url":"https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/secretary-of-state-for-justice-v-glyn-razzell/","source":"Judgement Courts Tribunals England Wales","id":3094436,"description":"Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2172 (Admin) Case No: AC-2026-LON-002538 In the High Court of Justice King’s Bench Division Referral of a Release Decision pursuant to S.32ZAA of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 14 August 2026 Before: Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb DBE Between: Secretary of State for Justice -v- Glyn Razzell (HV4928) The post Secretary of State for Justice -v- Glyn Razzell appeared first on Courts and Tribunals Judiciary"},{"pubDate":"Fri, 07 Aug 2026 14:03:33 +0200","url":"https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/rds-and-bayswater-support-group-v-secretary-of-state-for-health-and-social-care-anonymity-order/","titre":"RDS and Bayswater Support Group -v- Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (anonymity order)","id":3081876,"description":"Case number: AC-2026-LON-002515 In the High Court of Justice King’s Bench Division Administrative Court In the matter of an application for judicial review 17 July 2026 Before: The Hon. Mr Justice Sheldon Between: The King on the application of (1) RDS (2) Bayswater Support Group (Claimants) -v- Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Defendant) and NHS England (Interested Party) Order Notification of the Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12) Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant, the Defendant’s Summary Grounds of Defence and the Claimant’s Reply ORDER BY THE HON. Mr Justice Sheldon (1) Anonymity a. Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998: i. the names of the First Claimant, his children and his former spouse are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; ii. the name of the chair of the Second Claimant, her children and any partner are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public. iii. the First Claimant and chair of the Second Claimant are to be referred to orally and in writing as ‘RDS’ and ‘RDA’ respectively. iv. The First Claimant and Chair of the Second Claimant are permitted to use ‘care of’ (c/o) addresses of the Claimants’ solicitors in the claim form and on any witness statements filed. b. Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the First Claimant or Chair of the Second Claimant, or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of any of them, in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings. c. Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4): i. the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the said Claimants or any of the other individuals referred to in (a)(i) or (ii); ii. if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimants or to the identification of any of the other individuals referred to in (a)(i) or (ii), a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time; iii. unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case. iv. Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party. (2) Interested Party : NHS England, named in these proceedings as an Interested Party, shall be removed forthwith as a party to these proceedings. (3) Permission : Permission to apply for judicial review is refused. (4) Costs : The Claimants must pay the Defendant’s costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence, summarily assessed in the sum of £7,026.60. (5) Further provision as to costs : (a) Where the Claimants do not make a valid request for reconsideration of the decision to refuse permission to apply for judicial review (see notes below): (i) Within 14 days of the date of this Order, the Claimants may file and serve a notice of objection (maximum 3 pages) showing why the order in paragraph 4 should not be made. The notice should include any objections to the principle that costs should be paid and/or as to the amount assessed. (ii) If the Claimants do not file and serve a notice of objection within that period, paragraph 2 is a final order and the Claimants must pay the sum specified within 14 days of the date of this Order (in accordance with CPR 44.7(1)(a)). (iii) If the Claimants file and serve a notice of objection in accordance with (i) above: the other party may, within 14 days after the date on which the notice is served, file and serve submissions in response (maximum 3 pages); if the other party files and serves on the Claimants submissions in response, the Claimants may, within 7 days after the date on which the other party’s submissions in response are served, file and serve","source":"Judgement Courts Tribunals England Wales"},{"source":"Judgement Courts Tribunals England Wales","description":"Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCOP 29 (T3) Case No: 14028041 In the Court of Protection in the matter of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in the matter of the Mental Health Act 1983 23 July 2026 Before: Mr Justice Peel Between: Patricia (by her Accredited Legal Representative) -v- Cygnet Healthcare Ltd Patricia’s father Patricia’s mother Patricia’s aunt The post Re Patricia (MHA 1983 and s28 MCA 2005) appeared first on Courts and Tribunals Judiciary","id":3050912,"url":"https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/re-patricia-mha-1983-and-s28-mca-2005/","titre":"Re Patricia (MHA 1983 and s28 MCA 2005)","pubDate":"Fri, 24 Jul 2026 14:06:26 +0200"},{"pubDate":"Thu, 12 Jun 2025 10:06:44 +0200","url":"https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-138/codify-gardner/","titre":"Codify Gardner","source":"Harvard Law Review","id":2175056,"description":"The Gardner presumption, also known as the pro-veteran canon, is a substantive canon of interpretation named after the Supreme Court case Brown v. Gardner. The canon instructs courts to construe ambiguous statutes concerning veterans’ benefits in favor of the veteran. While the canon today rarely acts as a tiebreaker, it has historically represented a strong congressional intent to care for veterans. The post Codify Gardner appeared first on Harvard Law Review"}]