[{"source":"The Conversation – Articles (FR)","id":3248553,"description":"KEY TAKEAWAYS The French high schooler-led uprising is not a sign of a generational struggle pitting the young against baby boomers. The uprisings indicate a state of discontentment reflecting three grievances: failings within the education system, eco-anxiety and concerns over employment in the age of AI. Far from demanding a break with the established order, young protesters are simply asking for the right to live a good and fair life... like their predecessors before them. Rarely has Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents seemed so relevant to the times in which we are living. Although the discontents we are currently witnessing do not necessarily affect society as a whole, they are certainly impacting an entire generation born in the 21st century, as well as their parents and their social environment. Admittedly, we know that generations are not homogeneous and that any attempt to generalise is an oversimplification. Nevertheless, the high schoolers that are taking to the streets to protest in this day and age belong to a relatively homogeneous age cohort. You would be forgiven for thinking that the current unrest is the result of a clash of generations. From the outside, it is often viewed as a generational tug of war between a struggling young population and the rest: an aging but relatively prosperous Europe . Criticism is, without doubt, being directed at “baby-boomers” or those born during the thirty years following World War II (which were marked by economic prosperity and low unemployment, conditions that now seem a world away today). The problem lies elsewhere Nevertheless, this is not a generational conflict, and the fact that a substantial proportion of parents , as well as the majority of the population , share the students’ demands shows that the problem lies elsewhere. These demands are nothing new, and they help explain why many parents joined their children during the first demonstrations, along with teachers, to show their support over deteriorating conditions in high schools. The students and their initial demands were hijacked by more politically radical movements, some even revolutionary or anarchist, as well as opportunistic groups that took advantage of the disorder to loot shops and businesses, without any tangible political agenda. According to an official report dated October 14, 2026, “937 law enforcement officers, 248 students and 149 members of educational staff have been injured since the beginning of the high school student movement.” The demonstrations on October 18 resulted in more than 1,800 arrests . The proliferation of various groups with overlapping demands muddles the student movements’ original message, leaving us with little more than the smouldering remnants of a battlefield. Nevertheless, it is the central concerns of these students that I wish to explore here. Ultimately, this movement appears to lie at the intersection of several anxiety-inducing issues. Rather than speaking of a convergence of struggles, we should speak of a convergence of anxieties. Three sources of anxiety The movement appears to reflect the convergence of three factors that are also sources of concern: the perceived deterioration of public education ecological anxiety the new difficulties young people face in the labour market, particularly those associated with the development of artificial intelligence (AI). These three factors provide fertile ground for psychosocial anxiety. The high school students’ main demands appear legitimate and concern improving working conditions: replacing absent teachers, shortening excessively long school days, reducing the number of students per class, repairing and maintaining infrastructure, and improving or abolishing Parcoursup , the widely criticised higher education admissions platform that is often difficult to understand. These demands echo the broader perception that conditions in the French school system have deteriorated and that the system is relatively inefficient compared with those of neighbouring countries.","pubDate":"Thu, 29 Oct 2026 07:58:22 +0100","url":"https://theconversation.com/france-three-overlapping-woes-are-fuelling-a-generation-of-discontent-295102","titre":"France: three overlapping woes are fuelling a generation of discontent"},{"url":"https://theconversation.com/the-impossible-equation-of-being-a-researcher-mother-striving-to-make-ends-meet-294312","titre":"The impossible equation of being a researcher mother, striving to make ends meet","pubDate":"Thu, 29 Oct 2026 07:58:21 +0100","description":"How can we encourage women to pursue scientific careers? In recent years, a number of mentoring or awareness campaigns have been put in place to encourage French high school students to study maths, physics or engineering sciences, while they remain underrepresented in these fields. One of the last large-scale initiatives is the Filles et Maths program , launched in 2025, including work on gender bias, the implementation of “role models” or timetables featuring flexible hours. The program was nonetheless met with criticism: while women remain under-represented in some disciplines, they also remain a minority in the highest positions across the board in the academic world, from mathematics to social sciences. In France, gender inequalities are therefore not limited to access to scientific studies: they cut across all university careers and make many women leave French Higher Education and Research before securing tenure. This “drain” is explained by several factors among which motherhood holds an important place. A survey in Denmark illustrates that unlike men, one in three women abandon their scientific career after the birth of their first child. The survey I have been conducting among doctoral students and social scientists highlights the difficulties faced by women who became mothers before becoming permanent employees. Since the 1980s , recruitment requirements have become tougher with candidates needing to have written a good PhD paper, regularly have their work published , participate in scientific events and get involved in the life of research labs. Much of this work falls under hope labour , that is, unpaid work done in the hope of future employment. In this context, what could be called the myth of the “total researcher” takes shape. This is based on the double penalty of being a productive scientist (without necessarily receiving any financial reward) and embodying the ideal of a career woman, devoted companion, and dedicated mother all rolled into one. However, this ideal of the “total researcher” clashes with the actual conditions of scientific work and motherhood. Paying the motherhood penalty in academia Becoming a full-time researcher requires mothers who aren’t tenured researchers to reorganise their lives. Some cram several days’ work into one by doing casual work, part-time teaching, unpaid scientific projects, and parental responsibilities. The pace often makes women work under pressure, sometimes at the expense of the quantity and quality of their scientific work. Other women choose to remain unemployed or take parental leave and thus link their career to that of their spouse if they earn enough. If this strategy of linked career is favourable for scientific production when you have a child, it also creates material dependence that could lead to sexist and sexual violence within the family unit, which this testimony from Jeanne, a doctor and mother of a little girl, illustrates: “I sometimes feel like I have to [‘have sex’], telling myself that ‘I owe him’ and ‘He lets me know it’.” In a professional context , where every moment must count, maternity, parental or sick leave become scientific working hours in themselves. Rebecca, for example, shared that she continued writing her final thesis when her son was sent to hospital in an emergency. This situation feeds a feeling of double guilt: the respondents believe they are never up to par, neither as mothers nor as researchers. Joana explains: “I took parental leave from work, but I feel bad about working when I see my son next to me.” Some non-tenured researcher dads, on the other hand, benefit from an academic paternity bonus. The gendered division of domestic and parental tasks, as well as taking paternity leave, sometimes allows them to devote more time to their research. To quote Marion’s doctor of History husband’s words: “I have completed nearly two articles in one month of paternity leave!” The","id":3248546,"source":"The Conversation – Articles (FR)"},{"id":3244497,"description":"KEY TAKEAWAYS Social policies, such as support for small businesses, and a shorter working week without a loss of pay helped president Lula to turn around Brazil’s election. Street protests and social media strengthened Lula’s campaign amid allegations of election interference by Meta favouring Flávio Bolsonaro. Major challenges lie ahead as Lula faces a right-leaning Congress, opposition from the Bolsonaro movement and pressure from the Trump administration. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won Brazil’s presidential election with 51.79% of valid votes, unexpectedly reversing the first-round result won by Flávio Bolsonaro, a first in Brazilian presidential elections. Between the two rounds, he gained about 10.4 million additional votes. Defeated, right-wing challenger Flávio Bolsonaro announced that he would ask for the election to be annulled. The next day, his party, the Liberal Party (PL), acknowledged the result. Brazil’s nonalignment sounds a warning to the global far right Beyond halting the advance of Donald Trump’s and Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s influence in the region, Brazil’s election result points to strategies by which far right success in other countries can be contained. It is also a personal defeat for Trump, who invested energy and influence without openly declaring his support, but with the objective of returning the Bolsonaro family to power. Lula’s victory can be attributed to three equally important factors. The first is a package of social measures: an increase in Bolsa Família, the government’s flagship cash-transfer program; the announcement of measures benefiting individual microentrepreneurs (MEI), who account for nearly 70% of active businesses in Brazil; and, above all, the approval, during the second-round campaign, of the government’s bill reducing the working week from six to five days with no loss of pay . In a poll conducted four days before the vote, this legislation was the news item that mattered most in determining voters’ choice (17%). It was followed by reports of Supreme Federal Court (STF) justices’ involvement in the Banco Master corruption case (14%), politicians’ involvement in the same case (13%), and the Lula government’s lifting of the ban on online betting houses, known as “bets” (11%). Between the two rounds, Lula raised his government’s approval rating, particularly among higher-income voters (+6 p.p) and right-wing voters outside of bolsonarismo (+12 p.p), i.e. groups that make up Flávio’s voter base. Over the same period, fear of the Bolsonaro family’s return to power overtook fear of Lula’s reelection (44% to 42%) . Taking to the streets and digital power Such a turnaround was driven, in large part, by mass mobilisation of Lula’s supporters in the streets and on social media. Large rallies called by students and other mostly young people brought millions of people on the streets, breaking the chill seen in the preceding weeks . The largest rally in support of Lula took place in São Paulo on October 24. Demonstrators sang the Independence Anthem of Brazil, a clear reference to Brazil’s independence from Trump’s interventionist policy . Part of this interventionism was attributed to the actions of Meta, the parent company of Instagram, Facebook and WhatsApp. During the second-round campaign, allegations grew that the company had favoured Flávio Bolsonaro and other far-right candidates by manipulating its algorithms . While Meta denied any favouritism, blaming technical failures, internal messages revealed by Folha de S. Paulo revealed that Lula’s campaign had been unable to boost posts for nearly 24 hours in October. In reaction to the far right’s domination of the digital environment, one of the major landmarks of the second round was the creation of the “Lula’s Army”, a WhatsApp channel set up by a federal deputy that gathered more than 10 million","source":"The Conversation – Articles (FR)","pubDate":"Tue, 27 Oct 2026 13:57:26 +0100","titre":"Brazil: Lula’s presidential win puts the brakes on the rise of the far right in Latin America","url":"https://theconversation.com/brazil-lulas-presidential-win-puts-the-brakes-on-the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-latin-america-295219"},{"titre":"France’s ‘casseurs’: why the term fails to do justice to the extent of looting and spiralling unrest","url":"https://theconversation.com/frances-casseurs-why-the-term-fails-to-do-justice-to-the-extent-of-looting-and-spiralling-unrest-294805","pubDate":"Thu, 22 Oct 2026 08:03:11 +0200","source":"The Conversation – Articles (FR)","description":"Following widespread looting sprees and acts of violence occurring on the sidelines of the October 17 student protests, so-called “casseurs” seem to be the centre of attention. But the term, which comes from the French verb casser or “to break”, poses more questions than answers. The sociologist Paolo Stuppia examines the unprecedented situation many cities across France are having to contend with, and the complex combination of collective action whose motivations are unclear and the social media’s extreme agility. The Conversation: How unprecedented are the scenes of looting that we witnessed on the sidelines of the October 17 demonstrations? Paolo Stuppia: What may be unprecedented is the extent of the destruction of private property and the goods that have been stolen. It should be clear, however, that not all the looters can necessarily be sorted into identifiable groups, at least politically. Indeed, as the politician Xavier Crettiez, the sociologist Isabelle Sommier and the historian François Audigier emphasised in 2021 in their joint project Violences politiques en France , the targets of acts of violence that are considered to be politically motivated can be determined both by technical constraints and the militant culture of the people involved. Let us recall Italy in the 1970s when autonomous activists spoke of “self-reduction” (the act of seizing goods or essential services), Maoists in France spoke of proletarian reappropriation. Their raid on Fauchon’s luxury grocery store on place de la madeleine and the redistribution of goods to slums and workers’ hostels that ensued went down in history as their biggest claim to fame. Can we go as far as to say that the October 17 looting sprees were politically motivated ? Even if we do not have all the details concerning the profiles of the people arrested, videos posted on social media and stolen goods being resold online tend to rule out the idea. That said, at least some of the targets were chosen haphazardly. While some are symbols of capitalism, like luxury stores, insurance companies, banks, multinationals , others included a number of more localised stores, small shops selling toys or video games; for example, which are rarely targets for such incidents. If, especially since the alter-globalisation movement , we have seen the emergence of damage to property, primarily targeting symbols of capitalism and multinationals, in particular; this phenomenon goes hand in hand with “off the cuff” incidents by groups without any political affiliation, who join demonstrations to “get in on the act” in such a way that we are unable to determine whether it’s just a way of letting off steam or if it’s driven by a goal of redistributing goods – this weekend we witnessed some scenes of goods being redistributed, such as food being given to the homeless. What do we know about casseurs’ profiles? When did they appear in the demonstrations and when did the term first appear in the media? P.S.: Historically, the first research article on the casseur phenomenon can be traced back to the sociologist Gwenola Ricordeau . In France in the 1990s, as was the case during the student and high school movement of 1998, Ricordeau noticed that young people came to demonstrations to commit acts of vandalism or to mug people without having anything to do with the causes behind protest movements. They were driven by opportunism and also a desire to break up the monotony of everyday life. The fact of disqualifying people by designating them as “criminals on the street” therefore ultimately leads us to riot-like phenomena, with or without the “looting” element, which are part of the continuity of “suburban revolt” or “city riots” which have gradually developed in working-class neighbourhoods since the second half of the 1970s. As we demonstrated alongside the sociologist Valérie Becquet in our book Géopolitique de la jeunesse , it","id":3233179}]